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Abstract 
Markowitz hypothesized a fourfold pattern of risk preferences, with risk aversion for large gains and small 
losses, but risk seeking for small gains and large losses. We test his hypothesis, and obtain two major 
results. One is the dispersion effect: A majority exhibits risk seeking and risk aversion for small and large 
gains, but disperses into five preference groups for small and large losses. There are the „Markowitzians‟ 
(risk aversion and risk seeking), the „non-Markowitzians‟ (risk seeking and risk aversion), the „Cautious‟ 
(global risk aversion), the „Audacious‟ (global risk seeking), and the „Wavering‟ (who exhibit no definite 
preference pattern). The other result is the migration effect: The composition of the preference groups 
changes across risk levels. More specifically, when going from high to moderate risk levels, the shares of 
the Markowitzians and the Cautious fall while the shares of the Audacious and the non-Markowitzians 
rise. We show that, if prospect theory accommodates the dispersion effect by allowing for heterogeneity in 
the elasticity of the value function and the elevation of the probability-weighing function, it correctly 
predicts the migration effect. 
Keywords 
Risk aversion, risk seeking, preference heterogeneity, preference uncertainty, Markowitz, prospect theory. 
JEL Codes 
C90, C91, D01, D03. 
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Anomalies to Markowitz’s Hypothesis and a Prospect-Theoretical Interpretation 
Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way (Leo Tolstoy, Anna 
Karenina). 
In most analyses of risky choice, a typical decision maker is assumed to exhibit modal preference 
patterns. This is true of the earliest analyses (Bernoulli, 1738/1954) and continues through to the present 
(Brandstätter et al., 2006; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Loomes, 2010; 
Markowitz, 1952). Thus, for instance, if, over a series of choices, modal preferences shift from risk 
seeking to risk aversion, it is assumed that a typical decision maker exhibits this shift. This typical 
decision maker is then described by models of individual decision making under risk. 
We investigate a series of choices designed by Markowitz (1952). These are choices between a 
sure thing and a gamble with the same expected value, in a series where the sure thing varies from very 
small to very large. The preference patterns he observed “informally” motivated the development of what 
now, with the advent of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), would be called a reference-
dependent theory of risky choice. We conduct a systematic and large-scale investigation of the choice 
series designed by Markowitz, and find that the predictions of both Markowitz‟s theory and prospect 
theory are far off the mark: At the aggregate level (modal preference patterns), the predicted preference 
patterns are not confirmed, and, at the disaggregate level (individual preference patterns), the typical 
decision maker does not exist. 
We obtain two major results. One is the dispersion effect: In gains, most people exhibit the 
preference pattern described by Markowitz, but, in losses, they disperse into groups with different 
preference patterns. The other result is the migration effect: The composition of the preference groups 
changes across risk levels. We show that, if prospect theory accommodates the dispersion effect by 
allowing for heterogeneity in the elasticity of the value function and the elevation of the probability-
weighing function, it correctly predicts the migration effect. We discuss implications for the purchase of 
gambles and insurances, and other issues raised by our investigation. 
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1. Markowitz’s Theory: 
A Fourfold Pattern in Outcome Magnitude 
Markowitz (1952) questioned the common assumption that people are globally risk averse, 
meaning they will prefer a sure thing to a gamble with the same expected monetary value. He reported that 
respondents in an informal survey were risk averse for large gains and small losses, but risk seeking for 
small gains or large losses. They preferred a 1/10 chance of gaining $1 to gaining 10 cents for sure (risk 
seeking), but preferred gaining $1 million for sure to a 1/10 chance of gaining $10 million (risk aversion); 
conversely, they preferred losing 10 cents for sure to a 1/10 chance of losing $1 (risk aversion), but 
preferred a 1/10 chance of losing $10 million to losing $1 million for sure (risk seeking). To explain this 
fourfold pattern of risk preferences, which we call the „M4 pattern,‟ Markowitz proposed a triply inflected, 
reference-dependent value function. Like the prospect theory value function, Markowitz‟s is defined over 
positive and negative deviations from current wealth (gains and losses). Unlike the prospect theory value 
function, which is concave in gains and convex in losses, Markowitz‟s is first convex and only then 
concave in gains, and first concave and only then convex in losses. Markowitz‟s theory is an expected 
value model, meaning that outcome values are weighted by outcome probabilities, and it is for this reason 
that it needs the triply inflected value function to produce the M4 pattern. As we discuss next, prospect 
theory can produce the M4 pattern by combining a non-linear probability-weighing function with a special 
value function. 
2. Prospect Theory: 
The Fourfold Pattern in Outcome Magnitude 
Prospect theory is a non-expected value model. This means that outcome values are weighted by a 
non-linear transformation of probabilities, so that the value of a gamble is not its expectation, pv(x), as in 
Markowitz‟s theory, but the product of a probability weight and the outcome value, w(p)v(x). In prospect 
theory, the probability-weighing function overweighs low probabilities and underweighs moderate to high 
ones. If it overweighs Markowitz‟s 1/10, as is generally assumed, it will contribute to risk seeking in gains 
and risk aversion in losses. The value function, on the other hand, is concave over gains and convex over 
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losses (diminishing sensitivity), contributing to risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses. For 
Markowitzian choices, therefore, the probability-weighing function and the value function work in 
opposite directions. 
The M4 pattern requires that the probability-weighing function outweighs the value function for 
small outcomes, i.e., w(1/10) > v(x)/v(10x), but is outweighed by it for large ones, i.e., v(mx)/v(10mx) > 
w(1/10) for some m > 1. If we combine the two inequalities, we get 
)10(
)(
)10(
)(
xv
xv
mxv
mxv
  for m > 1. 
This property of the value function is called decreasing elasticity (al-Nowaihi, & Dhami, 2009; Scholten 
& Read, 2010; see also Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992): As the magnitude of x increases by constant 
proportions, the magnitude of v(x) increases by decreasing proportions. For instance, doubling $100 yields 
a smaller proportional increase in value than doubling $1. Geometrically, log(v(x)) is a concave function 
of log(x). 
Decreasing elasticity has not previously been associated with prospect theory. A power value 
function, as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), has constant elasticity (within the domains of 
gains and losses). Geometrically, log(v(x)) is a linear function of log(x). Both Köbberling and Wakker‟s 
(2005) normalized exponential function and Scholten and Read‟s (2010) normalized logarithmic function 
are reference-dependent value functions with decreasing elasticity. The Appendix discusses the concept of 
elasticity more extensively. For gains, the normalized logarithmic function combines decreasing absolute 
risk aversion with increasing relative risk aversion, the two conditions for utility functions discussed by 
Abdellaoui et al. (2007), and Holt and Laury (2002), whereas the normalized exponential function 
combines increasing relative risk aversion with constant absolute risk aversion. 
Prospect theory can therefore produce the M4 pattern if it combines an overweighing of low 
probabilities with a decreasingly elastic value function. However, it can also produce other preference 
patterns, depending on whether the probability-weighing function outweighs the value function for small 
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outcomes, and on how the elasticity in gains compares with the elasticity in losses. We next discuss these 
predictions. 
3. Prospect Theory: 
A Twofold Pattern and Two Threefold Patterns in Outcome Magnitude 
In this section, we discuss how prospect theory can produce four preference patterns in 
Markowitzian choices between x and (10x, .1). We assume that the probability-weighing function is the 
same for gains and losses. While this assumption may be relaxed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), doing so 
would not change the predictions we derive from prospect theory; it would only sometimes open different 
routes to the same predictions. In any event, prospect theory needs decreasing elasticity to produce the M4 
pattern, but does not need domain-specific probability weighing to accommodate the evidence we obtain 
in our experiments. In the remainder of this paper, and unless otherwise indicated, „prospect theory‟ will 
refer to „prospect theory augmented with decreasing elasticity.‟ For the choices examined in this paper, 
between a sure thing x and a gamble (x/p, p), original prospect theory coincides with cumulative prospect 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
As just discussed, prospect theory combines diminishing sensitivity to outcomes with the 
overweighing of low probabilities. Diminishing sensitivity contributes to risk aversion in gains and risk 
seeking in losses, whereas the overweighing of low probabilities contributes to risk seeking in gains and 
risk aversion in losses. The predictions of prospect theory depend on the relative strength of these 
opposing forces. Risk preferences will reverse only if the probability-weighing function outweighs the 
value function for small outcomes but is outweighed by it for large ones.
1
 That is, when 
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Risk preferences will never reverse if the probability-weighing function never outweighs the value 
function. This would yield a twofold pattern of global risk aversion in gains and global risk seeking in 
losses: 
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The M4 pattern and the twofold pattern can occur regardless of how elasticity in gains compares 
with elasticity in losses. There are three logical possibilities: Either elasticity is equal for losses and gains, 
or it is greater for losses, or it is greater for gains. If elasticity is equal for losses and gains (symmetric 
elasticity), the value ratio (between the values of the sure thing and the risky outcome) is unchanged by a 
sign reversal: 
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Alternatively, if elasticity is greater for losses (loss amplification; see Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991), the 
value ratio is smaller for losses: 
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Finally, if elasticity is greater for gains (gain amplification), the value ratio is smaller for gains: 
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 for x > 0.                                        (3) 
Symmetric elasticity, loss amplification, and gain amplification relate to how close to linearity the 
value function is in gains and in losses. We can illustrate this with the power value function proposed by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992): 
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where 0 < ,  < 1 are diminishing sensitivity (the value function is concave in gains and convex in 
losses) and  > 1 is constant loss aversion (see also Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Symmetric elasticity 
means  = .  Loss amplification means  > , and gain amplification means  > . The evidence 
reviewed by Wakker et al. (2007, Note 1) includes cases of both symmetric and asymmetric elasticity, 
with loss amplification being more prevalent than gain amplification. 
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Regardless of whether the elasticity of the value function is symmetric or asymmetric, it is 
possible that, in both gains and losses, the probability-weighing function outweighs the value function for 
small outcomes but is outweighed by it for large ones, yielding the M4 pattern, or never outweighs the 
value function, yielding the twofold pattern. Under symmetric elasticity, and in the absence of domain-
specific probability weighing, these are the only two possibilities: The value ratio v(x)/v(10x) is the same 
for gains and losses (Expression 1), so that, if w(1/10) exceeds the value ratio for small gains, it will 
exceed the value ratio for small losses as well, or, alternatively, if w(1/10) never exceeds the value ratio 
for gains, it will never exceed the value ratio for losses either. Under asymmetric elasticity, however, two 
other preference patterns can emerge. 
Under loss amplification, the value ratio is smaller for losses than for gains (Inequality 2), so 
w(1/10) can exceed the value ratio for small losses but never exceed the value ratio for gains. This would 
yield a threefold pattern of global risk aversion in gains, alongside a reversal from risk aversion to risk 
seeking in losses. Under gain amplification, the value ratio is smaller for gains than for losses (Inequality 
3), so w(1/10) can exceed the value ratio for small gains but never exceed the value ratio for losses. This 
would yield a threefold pattern of global risk seeking in losses, alongside a reversal from risk seeking to 
risk aversion in gains. 
In sum, for choices between x and (10x, .1), or „10x choices,‟ prospect theory produces not only 
the M4 pattern, but also a twofold pattern and two threefold patterns in outcome magnitude, and thus 
produces a broader set of predictions than Markowitz‟s theory does. This situation is unique, however, to 
choices between a sure thing and a low-probability gamble. We next consider choices between x and (2x, 
.5), or „2x choices,‟ for which prospect theory predicts only the twofold pattern in outcome magnitude, 
while Markowitz‟s theory continues to predict only the M4 pattern. 
4. Markowitz’s Theory and Prospect Theory: 
The Fourfold Pattern and the Twofold Pattern in Outcome Magnitude 
In Markowitz‟s theory, the value function changes from convex to concave in gains and from 
concave to convex in losses, so that, for 2x choices as well as 10x choices, the prediction is the M4 pattern. 
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In prospect theory, however, 2x choices differ from 10x choices in that the value function and the 
probability-weighing function both contribute to risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses: The 
value function because of diminishing sensitivity, and the probability-weighing function because it 
underweighs the moderate probability of .5. Thus, for 2x choices, prospect theory predicts a twofold 
pattern of global risk aversion in gains and global risk seeking in losses. This prediction extends to choices 
between a sure thing and a high-probability gamble, because high probabilities are underweighted as well. 
We next discuss existing evidence on Markowitz‟s hypothesis. 
5. Existing Evidence 
The earliest evidence comes from Hershey and Schoemaker (1980, Table 3, rows 13-17). Letting x 
be the sure outcome and (x/p, p) be a gamble yielding x/p with probability p, they set p at .01, and x at $1, 
$100, $1,000, and $10,000 (in this section, x stands for the magnitude of x, or its absolute value). The 
results supported Markowitz‟s hypothesis: As x increased, aggregate choices changed from risk seeking to 
risk aversion for gains, but from risk aversion to risk seeking for losses. However, choice probabilities 
were closer to chance level (i.e., closer to a 50/50 distribution) for losses than for gains, a finding that 
extends beyond Markowitzian choice series (e.g., Schoemaker, 1990).
3
 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) conducted three studies, in which p was set at .1, .5, and .8 (Study 1, 
Table 2) or at .1, .5, and .9 (Studies 2 and 3, Table 4), and x was set at $2, $200, and $20,000 (Study 1, 
hypothetical payoffs), at $1 and $10,000 (Study 2, hypothetical payoffs), or at $0.10 and $10 (Study 3, real 
payoffs). 
In gains, Markowitz‟s hypothesis was supported at all probability levels: As x increased, aggregate 
choices moved away from risk seeking and toward risk aversion. For p = .1, there was either global but 
decreasing risk seeking or a reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion; for p = .5 and .8, there was a 
reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion; for p = .9, there was global and increasing risk aversion. The 
reversals for moderate to high probabilities are inconsistent with prospect theory, because the probability-
weighing function underweighs those probabilities, and thus contributes, together with the concave value 
function, to risk aversion. 
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In losses, the results showed a great diversity. In Study 1, the direction of the results depended on 
the probability level. For p = .1, there was global but decreasing risk aversion, consistent with 
Markowitz‟s hypothesis and prospect theory. For p = .5, there was a reversal from risk seeking to risk 
aversion, when Markowitz would predict a reversal in the opposite direction, and prospect theory would 
predict global and increasing risk seeking, because (1) the probability-weighing function underweighs 
moderate probabilities, and thus contributes, together with the convex value function, to risk seeking, and 
(2) the value function is decreasingly elastic. For p = .8, there was global but decreasing risk seeking, 
when Markowitz and prospect theory would predict increasing risk seeking. In Study 2, the results did not 
depend on the probability level: There was an almost constant level of risk seeking, when Markowitz and 
prospect theory would predict increasing risk seeking. Finally, in Study 3, the results again depended on 
the probability level, but were always inconsistent with Markowitz‟s hypothesis and prospect theory. For p 
= .1, there was a reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion; for p = .5, there was global but decreasing risk 
seeking; for p = .9, there was an almost constant level of risk seeking. Across all studies, and as in 
Hershey and Schoemaker‟s (1980) study, choice probabilities were closer to chance level for losses than 
for gains. 
The results of the studies reviewed above confirm Markowitz‟s hypothesis for gains: As outcome 
magnitude increased, aggregate choices moved away from risk seeking and toward risk aversion. This 
trend has also been observed in matching (Fehr-Duda et al., 2010) and choice-based matching (e.g., Green 
et al, 1999). However, the results showed a great diversity for losses. Aggregate choices either moved 
away from risk aversion and toward risk seeking, as Markowitz hypothesized, or they moved in the 
opposite direction, or they did not move at all. Moreover, choice probabilities were generally closer to 
chance level for losses than for gains. The combination of a clear trend in gains and an unclear trend in 
losses has also been observed in matching (Fehr-Duda et al., 2010). We next offer a possible interpretation 
of these results. 
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6. An Interpretation of Existing Evidence: 
Dispersion and Migration Effects 
We build an ideal representation of the existing evidence, in which people who exhibit the 
Markowitzian reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains disperse into five preference groups in 
losses: (1) The Markowitzians, who exhibit a reversal from risk aversion to risk seeking, (2) the non-
Markowitzians, who exhibit a reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion, (3) The Audacious, who are 
globally risk seeking; (4) the Cautious, who are globally risk averse, and (5) the Wavering, who do not 
exhibit a definite preference pattern. This dispersion into different preference groups is the dispersion 
effect, which involves preference heterogeneity (i.e., different people exhibiting different preference 
patterns), and, due to the inclusion of the Wavering among the preference groups, preference uncertainty 
(i.e., people exhibiting preferences that do not conform to a definite pattern). In our ideal representation of 
the existing evidence, we will assume that the Wavering have an uncontrollably trembling hand in losses, 
so that their choices in that domain are completely at random. 
The existing evidence includes two results. One is that choice probabilities are closer to chance 
level for losses than for gains. We see two explanations for this result. One is preference uncertainty: The 
Wavering bring the aggregate choices closer to a 50/50 distribution. The other explanation is preference 
heterogeneity: The aggregate choices are brought closer to a 50/50 distribution by the Markowitzians and 
non-Markowitzians, who reverse their preferences in opposite directions, and by the Audacious and the 
Cautious, who have globally opposite preferences. Both preference uncertainty and preference 
heterogeneity contribute to „risk neutrality‟ at the aggregate level where such neutrality may not exist at 
the disaggregate level. Risk neutrality would mean that the value of the sure thing and the value of the 
gamble are close together, so that people would feel more or less „indifferent‟ between the two options 
(Schneider, 1992). Neither Markowitz‟s theory nor prospect theory implies a greater indifference in losses 
than in gains. 
The other result, from Hogarth and Einhorn (1990), is that modal preference patterns in losses 
change across studies and, within studies, across probability levels. In our explanation, this is because the 
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composition of the preference groups changes, not because there exists a typical decision maker who 
exhibits changing preference patterns. The changing composition of the preference groups is the migration 
effect. We will develop an individual-difference formulation of prospect theory that, by allowing decision 
makers to disperse into different preference groups, correctly predicts how they will migrate between 
preference groups across probability levels. 
We will report three studies in which investigate preference patterns both at the aggregate and at 
the disaggregate level. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants make 10x choices and 2x choices, 
respectively. In both studies, the majority of the participants disperse into the five preference groups 
identified above (the dispersion effect). Furthermore, the composition of the preference groups changes 
across 10x and 2x choices (the migration effect). We then develop our individual-difference formulation of 
prospect theory. However, a comparison between Experiment 1 (10x choices) and Experiment 2 (2x 
choices) does not allow us to directly test how decision makers migrate between preference groups across 
probability levels (.1 and .5). We therefore conduct Experiment 3, in which the same participants make 
both 10x and 2x choices. This study confirms our prospect-theoretical interpretation of the results. 
7. Experiments 1 and 2 
Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted independently from one another, but both method and results 
warrant presenting them together. 
7.1. Method 
7.1.1. Participants and payment 
The participants were members of the Yale School of Management virtual laboratory (eLab). In 
Experiment 1, 189 participants included 73 men and 116 women, averaging 35 years of age. In 
Experiment 2, 255 participants included 92 men and 163 women, averaging 38 years of age. The great 
majority had college or a Bachelor‟s degree. Participants were entered in a lottery offering a 1 in 50 
chance to win a $50 Amazon.com gift certificate. For Markowitzian choice series, incentive compatible 
payment schedules, even probabilistic ones, are prohibitive. 
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7.1.2. Stimuli and procedure 
In Experiment 1, participants made six 10x choices for gains and for losses. The magnitude of the 
sure thing ranged from $0.25 to $25,000 in multiples of 10, and in that order. In Experiment 2, participants 
made seven 2x choices for gains and for losses. The magnitude of the sure outcome ranged from $0.25 to 
$250,000 in multiples of 10, and in that order. We fixed the order so as to recreate Markowitz‟s thought 
experiment as closely as possible. In Experiment 3, we evaluate whether fixing or randomizing the order 
has any effect on the results, which it has not. In each experiment, the order of gains and losses was 
counterbalanced between participants. 
On the welcome page, the participants read their rights in participating, including their payment. 
Once enrolled in the experiment, participants were informed that they would be given two types of 
choices. Sometimes they would choose between two possible receipts. Other times, they would choose 
between two possible payments. They were then shown how a choice would look like. They were further 
informed that, between choices, the screen would be white, and that they would have to hit the “Next 
question” button to continue. They then proceeded with the experimental trials. An example of a 10x 
choice in gains, as presented to the participants, is one between “a 1/10 chance of receiving $250” and 
“definitely receiving $25.” An example of a 2x choice in losses is one between “a 1/2 possibility of having 
to pay $50” and “definitely having to pay $25.” Upon completing the experimental trials, participants 
filled in their demographics. 
7.2. Results 
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the aggregate results for the 10x choices. Aggregate choices for 
gains were monotonically related to their magnitude, and reversed from risk seeking to risk aversion. 
Aggregate choices for losses were globally risk averse, but were not monotonically related to outcome 
magnitude. The results for losses contradict both Markowitz‟s theory, which would predict a reversal from 
risk aversion to risk seeking, and prospect theory, which would predict either the Markowitzian reversal or 
global risk seeking. The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the aggregate results for the 2x choices. Again, 
aggregate choices for gains were monotonically related to their magnitude, and reversed from risk seeking 
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to risk aversion. The results for gains contradict prospect theory, which would predict global risk aversion. 
Aggregate choices for losses also reversed from risk seeking to risk aversion, but were not monotonically 
related to outcome magnitude. The results contradict both Markowitz‟s theory, which would predict a 
reversal in the opposite direction, and prospect theory, which would predict global risk seeking. 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Table 1 shows the preference groups that emerged at the disaggregate level. A preference pattern 
with more than one preference shift is classified as „inconsistent.‟ Comfortable majorities (75% for 10x 
choices, 60% for 2x choices) changed from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains, but differed in losses. 
The Wavering were always the largest group. We considered how they would most likely have been 
classified had they not been inconsistent in losses. We did so by counting, for each participant among the 
Wavering, the number of matches with (1) each of the Markowitzian preference patterns (initial choices of 
the sure thing, subsequent choices of the gamble), (2) each of the non-Markowitzian patterns (initial 
choices of the gamble, subsequent choices of the sure thing), (3) the Cautious pattern (all choices of the 
sure thing), and (4) the Audacious pattern (all choices of the gamble), and assigning the participant to the 
group with the highest number of matches. Only those who matched the patterns of two or more groups 
equally well were not reclassified. The results are also included in Table 1. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
In 10x choices, the Markowitzians represented 20% of the sample, the Audacious 3%, and, not 
included in the table, other participants exhibiting prospect theory (PT) compatible preference patterns 
3%. The Cautious were the largest group, representing 28% of the sample. This is reflected in the 
aggregate data (top panel of Figure 1): Risk preferences reversed from risk seeking to risk aversion in 
gains but were globally risk averse in losses. In 2x choices, the Markowitzians represented 7% of the 
sample, and those exhibiting the twofold pattern of global risk aversion in gains and global risk seeking in 
losses, the pattern predicted by prospect theory, 1%. The non-Markowitzians were the largest group, 
representing 31% of the sample. This is also reflected in the aggregate data (bottom panel of Figure 1): 
Risk preferences reversed from risk seeking to risk aversion in both gains and losses. 
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As already evident from the above summary, the composition of the preference groups changed 
dramatically across 10x and 2x choices. When going from 10x to 2x choices, the shares of the 
Markowitzians and the Cautious fell significantly while the shares of the Audacious and the non-
Markowitzians rose significantly. We will next discuss how prospect theory can cover the four groups, and 
explain why the shares of the respective groups rose or fell. 
8. Dispersion and Migration Effects: 
A Prospect-Theoretical Interpretation 
We view the four preference groups as a behavioral reflection of four evaluation families, which 
we name M (after the Markowitzians), A (Audacious), N (Non-Markowitzians), and C (Cautious). The 
names refer to the preference pattern exhibited by the evaluation family in 2x choices. The groups differ in 
their value function and probability-weighing function, and have the following Characteristics: 
a. All groups have a value function that is decreasingly elastic in gains. 
b. Families M and A have a value function that is decreasingly elastic in losses. 
c. Families M and A have a value function that is more elastic in gains than in losses (gain 
amplification).  
d. Families N and C have a value function that is increasingly elastic in losses. 
e. Family C has the most elevated probability-weighing function, and family A has the least 
elevated probability-weighing function (see top left panel in Figure 2). 
f. All four families have a more elevated probability-weighing function than in standard 
prospect theory, overweighing low to moderate probabilities and underweighing high ones 
(see top left panel in Figure 2). 
While the names of the evaluation families are the initials of the preference pattern exhibited in 2x 
choices, we will show that, in 10x choices, it is possible for family A to exhibit the Markowitzian pattern, 
and for family C to exhibit the non-Markowitzian pattern. This is the migration effect, as summarized in 
Table 2, and as reflected in the changing composition of preference groups across Experiments 1 and 2. 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
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<Insert Table 2 about here> 
8.1. Gains 
We begin with the case of gains, in which all evaluation families exhibit the Markowitzian 
reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion. This, as discussed earlier, requires that the probability-
weighing function outweighs the value function for small outcomes, but is outweighed by it for large ones. 
Defining a value-ratio function as R(x, p) = v(x)/v(x/p), we have 
R(mx, p) > w(p) > R(x, p) for m > 1 and x > 0, 
The case of gains is shown in the top right panel of Figure 2. In what we call an „Rw-mapping plot,‟ 
probability-weighing functions are superimposed on value-ratio functions. Two value-ratio functions, one 
for small x and another for large x (i.e., mx), are plotted as a function of p. Because the value function is 
concave over gains, both R(x, p) and R(mx, p) are greater than p. Moreover, because the value function is 
decreasingly elastic in gains (Characteristic a), R(mx, p) is greater than R(x, p). The three probability-
weighing functions from the top left panel of Figure 2, which overweigh low to moderate probabilities 
(Characteristic f), are superimposed on the value-ratio functions. For low to moderate probabilities, w(p) is 
greater than R(x, p) but smaller than R(mx, p), yielding the Markowitzian reversal from risk seeking to risk 
aversion. 
8.2. Losses 
We now turn to losses, where the four evaluation families have distinct preference patterns. The 
Rw-mapping plots are shown in the bottom left (families M and A) and bottom right (families N and C) 
panels of Figure 2. 
8.2.1. Markowitzians and Audacious 
We first consider families M and A. Their value function is decreasingly elastic in losses 
(Characteristic b), so that, as in the case of gains, R(mx, p) is greater than R(x, p). Furthermore, their value 
function is less elastic in losses than in gains (gain amplification; Characteristic c), so that the value-ratio 
functions are more elevated in losses than in gains (compare the top right and bottom left panels of Figure 
2). This has no consequences in family M, whose probability-weighing function is more elevated than that 
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of family A (Characteristic e): For low to moderate probabilities, w(p) is greater than R(x, p) but smaller 
than R(mx, p), yielding the Markowitzian reversal from risk aversion to risk seeking. In family A, 
however, gain amplification does have consequences. For moderate probabilities, w(p) is smaller than R(x, 
p) as well as R(mx, p), yielding the Audacious pattern of global risk seeking. For low probabilities, which 
are overweighed more than moderate ones, w(p) is greater than R(x, p) but smaller than R(mx, p), yielding 
the Markowitzian pattern. Thus, for low probabilities, family A exhibits the Markowitzian pattern, but, for 
moderate probabilities, family A exhibits the Audacious pattern of global risk seeking. Because family A 
goes from Markowitzian to Audacious when going from 10x to 2x choices, but family M remains 
Markowitzian, we should see a fall in the share of the Markowitzians and a rise in the share of the 
Audacious (as we see in Table 1). This leads us to the first prediction of our prospect-theoretical analysis: 
Those who are Markowitzians in 10x choices will either remain Markowitzians or become Audacious in 
2x choices. That is, when going from 10x to 2x choices, there should be many cases changing from 
Markowitzian to Audacious but few cases changing in the opposite direction. 
8.2.2. Cautious and non-Markowitzians 
For families N and C, the situation is similar to that of families M and A, except that they have an 
increasingly elastic value function over losses (Characteristic d), so that R(x, p) is greater than R(mx, p).
4
 
The probability-weighing function of family C is more elevated than that of family N (Characteristic e). 
For low to moderate probabilities, w(p) is greater than R(x, p) as well as R(mx, p), yielding the Cautious 
pattern of global risk aversion.
5
 The probability-weighing function of family N is less elevated than that of 
family C. For moderate probabilities, w(p) is smaller than R(x, p) but greater than R(mx, p), yielding the 
non-Markowitzian reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion. For low probabilities, which are 
overweighed more than moderate ones, w(p) is greater than R(x, p) as well as R(mx, p), yielding the 
Cautious pattern. Thus, for low probabilities, family N exhibits the Cautious pattern, but, for moderate 
probabilities, family N exhibits the non-Markowitzian pattern. Because family N goes from Cautious to 
non-Markowitzian when going from 10x to 2x choices, but family C remains Cautious, we should see a 
fall in the share of the Cautious and a rise in the share of the non-Markowitzians (as we see in Table 1). 
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This leads us to the second prediction of our prospect-theoretical analysis: Those who are Cautious in 10x 
choices will either remain Cautious or become Non-Markowitzians in 2x choices. That is, when going 
from 10x to 2x choices, there should be many cases changing from Cautious to non-Markowitzian but few 
cases changing in the opposite direction. 
In Experiment 3, we test the above predictions by asking the same participants to make both 10x 
and 2x choices. 
9. Experiment 3 
9. 1. Method 
9.1.1. Participants and payment 
Population and recruitment were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. The participants were 569 
members of eLab, including 193 men and 365 women (11 participants did not fill in their gender), 
averaging 38 years of age. The great majority had some college or a Bachelor‟s degree. They were entered 
in a lottery offering a 1 in 50 chance to win a $50 Amazon.com gift certificate. 
9.1.2. Stimuli and procedure 
Participants made a series of seven 10x choices and a series of seven 2x choices for gains and for 
losses. The magnitude of the sure outcome ranged from $0.25 to $250,000 in multiples of 10. There were 
five between-participants conditions. In four conditions, the magnitude of the sure thing increased across 
choice tasks (as in Experiments 1 and 2). The order of 10x and 2x choices, and, within them, the order of 
gains and losses, was counterbalanced between participants. In a fifth condition, all choices were 
randomized. This condition was included as a check on the robustness of our results, and potential order 
effects (see Harrison et al., 2005). Randomization did not affect the results (see Discussion), and our 
analyses will therefore collapse over all five conditions. 
9.2. Results 
Figure 3 shows the aggregate results for the 10x and 2x choices, which replicate those from 
Experiments 1 and 2: A reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains combined with global risk 
aversion (10x choices) and a reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion (2x choices) in losses. Table 3 
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shows the disaggregate results, which also replicate those from the Experiments 1 and 2. First, a majority 
changed from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains, but dispersed into different preference groups in losses 
(dispersion effect). While our non-standard modification of prospect theory accounts for a majority of the 
cases (62% in the 10x choices and 51% in the 2x choices), standard prospect theory, augmented with 
decreasing elasticity, accounts for 31% of the cases in the 10x choices (21% Markowitzians, 6% 
Audacious, and 4% others), and only 2% of the cases in the 2x choices (those exhibiting the twofold 
pattern of global risk aversion in gains and global risk seeking in losses). Second, when going from 10x to 
2x choices, the shares of the Markowitzians and the Cautious fell significantly while the shares of the 
Audacious and the non-Markowitzian patterns rose significantly (migration effect). 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
To test the predictions about migration between preference groups, Table 4 reports observed 
minus expected number of transitions between preference groups across 10x and 2x choices, upon 
reclassification of the Wavering. The predictions are confirmed. First, those who were Markowitzians in 
10x choices tended to either remain Markowitzians or become Audacious in 2x choices (they also tended 
to become Wavering), whereas the Audacious tended to remain Audacious. Among those who made a 
transition between these two preference groups across 10x and 2x choices, a large majority (86%) were 
Markowitzians in 10x choices but Audacious in 2x choices, 2(1) = 7.14, p = .00. Second, those who were 
Cautious in 10x choices tended to either remain Cautious or become non-Markowitzians in 2x choices, 
whereas non-Markowitzians tended to remain non-Markowitzians. Among those who made a transition 
between these two preference groups across 10x and 2x choices, a large majority (86%) were Cautious in 
10x choices but non-Markowitzians in 2x choices, 2(1) = 15.21, p = .00. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
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9.3. Discussion 
The results from Experiment 3 show that we have arrived at a successful extension of prospect 
theory to individual differences in risky choice. This individual-difference analysis accounts for dispersion 
and migration effects. 
Our non-standard modification of prospect theory covers a majority of participants in both 10x 
and 2x choices, whereas standard prospect theory covers only a minority, and, in 2x choices, an almost 
nonexistent minority. Thus, to achieve a „decent‟ coverage, one must abandon the view of a typical 
decision maker, and allow for individual differences between decision makers, which, in our prospect-
theoretical interpretation of the results, are individual differences in the elasticity of the value function and 
the elevation of the probability-weighing function. 
Our analysis covers a significantly greater percentage of participants in 10x choices than in 2x 
choices, both in the between-participants analysis (75% in Experiment 1 vs. 60% in Experiment 2, see 
Table 1) and in the within-participant analysis (62% vs. 51% in Experiment 3, see Table 3). This may 
indicate that the overweighing of a .1 probability is more common than the overweighing of a .5 
probability, as standard prospect theory would imply. However, only a very small percentage of 
participants (2%) exhibited the preference pattern predicted by prospect theory in 2x choices (the twofold 
pattern of global risk aversion in gains and global risk seeking in losses). It thus seems that, when going 
from 10x to 2x choices, about 10% of the participants slip through the net, and start doing things that 
neither standard prospect theory nor our non-standard modification of prospect theory accommodates. 
As mentioned earlier, we included a randomized order condition. Randomization did not affect 
our conclusions about the differential composition of preference groups in 10x and 2x choices. To 
substantiate this, we computed, separately for the randomized order condition and the four non-
randomized order conditions, the difference in incidence rates of the Markowitzians, the non-
Markowitzians, the Cautious, and the Audacious between 10x and 2x choices. Figure 4 shows the result: 
Our conclusions are the same, regardless of whether choices were randomized or not. 
<Insert Figure 4 about here> 
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10. Are We Doing Something Wrong? 
The Fourfold Pattern in Outcome Probability 
10.1. Theory 
We have reported results that are surprisingly at odds with Markowitz‟s theory and standard 
prospect theory. This may raise doubts about our method. However, there seems nothing wrong with our 
method: We simply present participants with a series of choices between a sure thing and a gamble. 
Nonetheless, we felt the need to perform a check on our method. We did so by testing a fourfold pattern of 
risk preferences that has proven to be very robust in past studies, and that our method should be able to 
reproduce. 
Our focus has been on the M4 pattern, which concerns how risk preferences change as a function 
of outcome magnitude. This pattern differs from the fourfold pattern of risk preferences hypothesized by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the „KT4 pattern,‟ which concerns how risk 
preferences change as a function of outcome probability. As illustrated by Tversky and Fox (1995), and 
Tversky and Wakker (1995), people will prefer a 1/20 chance of gaining $100 to gaining $5 for sure (risk 
seeking), but will prefer gaining $95 for sure to a 19/20 chance of gaining $100 (risk aversion). 
Conversely, they will prefer losing $5 for sure to a 1/20 chance of losing $100 (risk aversion), but will 
prefer a 19/20 chance of losing $100 to losing $95 for sure (risk seeking). The KT4 pattern has proven to 
be very robust in past studies (e.g., Cohen et al., 1987, Table 2; Fehr-Duda et al., 2010, Figure 2; Hershey 
& Schoemaker, 1980, Table 3; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, Table 1; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, Table 
4; but see Harbaugh et al., 2009), and our method should be able to reproduce it. 
Prospect theory explains the KT4 pattern as follows. The probability-weighing function 
overweighs the low probability of 1/20, contributing to risk seeking in gains and risk aversion in losses, 
but underweighs the high probability of 19/20, contributing to risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in 
losses. The value function is concave in gains and convex in losses, contributing to risk aversion in gains 
and risk seeking in losses. The KT4 pattern will occur when, for the low probability of 1/20, the 
probability-weighing function outweighs the value function, i.e., w(p) > v(px) / v(x). 
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Just as prospect theory predicts alternatives to the M4 pattern in choices between x and (10x, .1), 
or 10x choices, so does it predict alternatives to the KT4 pattern in choices between px and (x, p), or „p 
choices.‟ Prospect theory predicts the KT4 pattern when the probability-weighing function outweighs the 
value function for low probabilities. However, this does not necessarily happen. When the probability-
weighing function is outweighed by the value function for both gains and losses, prospect theory predicts a 
twofold pattern of global risk aversion in gains and global risk seeking in losses. Under symmetric 
elasticity, and in the absence of domain-specific probability weighing, this is the only possible alternative 
to the KT4 pattern, because, if the probability-weighing function does not outweigh the value function in 
gains, it does not outweigh the value function in losses either, i.e., v(px) / v(x) = v(-px) / v(-x) > w(p) for x 
> 0. 
Under loss amplification, the probability-weighing function may outweigh the value function for 
losses but not for gains, i.e., v(px) / v(x) > w(p) > v(-px) / v(-x), producing a threefold pattern of global risk 
aversion in gains and a reversal from risk aversion to risk seeking in losses. Conversely, under gain 
amplification, the probability-weighing function may outweigh the value function for gains but not for 
losses, i.e., v(-px) / v(-x) > w(p) > v(px) / v(x), producing a threefold pattern of global risk seeking in losses 
and a reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains. 
In sum, prospect theory predicts four preference patterns, one of which is the KT4 pattern. 
Markowitz‟s theory does not predict the KT4 pattern, because, in his theory, the probability-weighing 
function is an identity function, i.e., w(p) = p. 
10.2. Stimuli and procedure 
In Experiments 2 and 3, the participants first made 2 choices between px and (x, p), or p choices, 
for gains and for losses, before proceeding to the Markowitzian choice series. The magnitude of the risky 
outcome was $100, and its probability was .05 and .95. In Experiment 2, the probability of the risky 
outcome increased across choice tasks, and the order of gains and losses was counterbalanced between 
participants. In Experiment 3, there were three between-participants conditions. In two conditions, the 
probability of the risky outcome increased across choice tasks, and the order of gains and losses was 
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counterbalanced between participants (as in Experiment 2). In a third condition, all choices were 
randomized. An example of a gain question, as presented to the participants, is the choice between “a 
19/20 chance of receiving $100” and “definitely receiving $95,” and an example of a loss question is the 
choice between “a 1/20 possibility of having to pay $100” and “definitely having to pay $5.” 
10.3. Results 
Figure 5 shows the aggregate results for Experiments 2 and 3. There is strong evidence for the 
KT4 pattern: A reversal from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains and from risk aversion to risk seeking 
in losses. The disaggregate results were also very similar for the two experiments, as summarized below. 
<Insert Figure 5 about here> 
10.3.1. Experiment 2 
A majority (55%) exhibited the four PT compatible preference patterns. Three of these groups 
contributed to the KT4 pattern at the aggregate level: Those exhibiting the KT4 pattern, i.e., a reversal 
from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains and from risk aversion to risk seeking in losses (28%), those 
exhibiting a reversal in losses but global risk aversion in gains (16%), and those exhibiting a reversal in 
gains but global risk seeking in losses (6%). The fourth group, those exhibiting global risk aversion in 
gains and global risk seeking in losses, represented 5% of the sample. 
Confirmatory cases in 2x choices tended to be confirmatory cases in p choices. A majority (61%) 
of those who, in 2x choices, changed from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains exhibited, in p choices, a 
PT compatible preference pattern, 2(1) = 7.51, p = .01, and the incidence rate of PT compatible 
preference patterns was significantly lower (47%) among those who, in 2x choices, did not change from 
risk seeking to risk aversion in gains, 2(1) = 5.19, p = .02.  
10.3.2. Experiment 3 
A majority (51%) exhibited the four PT compatible preference patterns. Three of these groups 
contributed to the KT4 pattern at the aggregate level: Those exhibiting the KT4 pattern (26%), those 
exhibiting a reversal in losses but not in gains (14%), and those exhibiting a reversal in gains but not in 
losses (6%). The fourth group, those exhibiting no reversal, represented 6% of the sample. 
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Confirmatory cases in 10x and 2x choices tended to be confirmatory cases in p choices. On the 
one hand, a majority (60%) of those who, in 10x choices, changed from risk seeking to risk aversion in 
gains exhibited, in p choices, a PT compatible preference pattern, 2(1) = 14.81, p = .00, and the incidence 
rate of PT compatible preference patterns was significantly lower (37%) among those who, in 10x choices, 
did not change from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains, 2(1) = 28.14, p = .00. On the other hand, a 
majority (58%) of those who, in 2x choices, changed from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains exhibited, 
in p choices, a PT compatible preference pattern, 2(1) = 7.64, p = .01, and the incidence rate of PT 
compatible preference patterns was significantly lower (45%) among those who, in 2x choices, did not 
change from risk seeking to risk aversion in gains, 2(1) = 5.19, p = .02. 
10.4. Conclusion 
Our method not only reproduces the KT4 pattern at the aggregate level, but also shows how this 
pattern emerges from four different preference groups at the disaggregate level. In addition, those cases 
who confirmed standard (and non-standard) prospect theory‟s predictions for p choices tended to be cases 
who confirmed non-standard prospect theory‟s predictions for 10x and 2x choices. 
11. General Discussion 
Harry Markowitz hypothesized a fourfold pattern of risk preferences, the „M4 pattern,‟ with risk 
aversion for large gains and small losses, but risk seeking for small gains and large losses. Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky later hypothesized another fourfold pattern of risk preference, the „KT4 
pattern,‟ with risk aversion for likely gains and unlikely losses, but risk seeking for unlikely gains and 
likely losses. To explain the M4 pattern, Markowitz preserved the expectation principle, i.e., w(p) = p, but 
replaced a concave utility function over final states of wealth by a triply inflected value function over 
changes of wealth, which is concave over large gains and small losses, but convex over small gains and 
large losses. To explain the KT4 pattern, Tversky and Kahneman replaced the expectation principle by 
probability weighing, with an overweighing of low probabilities, i.e., w(p) > p, and an underweighing of 
moderate to high ones, i.e., w(p) < p. Because Tversky and Kahneman also replaced the triply inflected 
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value function by a singly inflected value function, which is concave over gains and convex over losses, 
prospect theory can explain the M4 pattern only by combining the overweighing of low probabilities with 
a value function that is decreasingly elastic over gains and losses of increasing magnitude. 
We confirmed the KT4 pattern, which was already well-established, but not the M4 pattern. While 
Markowitz‟s hypothesis is correct for gains, it is generally wrong for losses. In reaction to this evidence, 
one might propose to preserve the expectation principle, and endow each preference group with its 
appropriately inflected value function. This proposal, however, does not explain why the composition of 
preference groups changes across probability levels. Nor does it explain the KT4 pattern. To explain this, 
we need probability weighing, and, therefore prospect theory. 
We have shown that prospect theory can accommodate our evidence if we make non-standard 
assumptions about both the value function and the probability-weighing function. These assumptions 
however, do not change the central tenets of prospect theory. For instance, there is nothing in prospect 
theory that prohibits an overweighing of moderate probabilities, or a non-constant elasticity of the value 
function. Moreover, experimental arrangements and individual differences may affect the functional forms 
of prospect theory, which have, indeed, shown great variability across studies, and across individuals 
within any particular study (e.g., Gonzalez & Wu, 1999). More generally, the stability of functional forms in 
decision making has been called into question (e.g., Ungemach et al., 2011). One variable aspect of prospect 
theory is probability weighing. Our experimental arrangement, involving Markowitzian choice series, 
suggests that moderate probabilities are overweighted, whereas other experimental arrangements suggest that 
they are underweighted (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000, Figure 5; Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000, Figure 2, Tversky & 
Fox, 1995, Figure 9; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, Figure 1). Substantive theory should explain this 
variability. 
Markowitz framed his theory as an explanation of why people simultaneously purchase insurance 
and gambles. Upon identifying implausible implications of the analysis offered by Friedman and Savage 
(1948), Markowitz proposed his triply inflected value function over changes of wealth, in which a small 
loss (the price of an insurance or a gamble) is barely different from the status quo, whereas the large 
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potential calamity against which one insures and the large potential prize for which one gambles are not. 
Our analysis shows that Markowitz‟s proposal is not viable either. So we must sketch the implications of 
our analysis for the behavior that he set out to explain. 
In standard prospect theory, the purchase of insurance and gambles is promoted by the 
overweighing of low probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The willingness to purchase insurance is 
mitigated by the convexity of the value function over losses, and the willingness to purchase gambles is 
mitigated both by the concavity of the value function over gains and by loss aversion when the loss (the 
price of the gamble) is segregated from the potential gain (the prize; see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Apart from these general principles, however, there are, in our non-standard modification of prospect 
theory, particularities of different groups in the evaluation of risky prospects. 
We identified four groups, each with their unique combination of a value function and a 
probability-weighing function. Let us name them by the preferences they expressed in the 50/50 gambles 
involving losses. Using the same functional forms as in Figure 2, the reservation prices for insuring 
against a .01 probability of losing $1,000 (fair price is $10) are: 
$16 (Markowitzians), 
$11 (Audacious), 
$193 (non-Markowitzians), and 
$255 (Cautious). 
Three relations can be established. First, the Markowitzians and the Audacious react in the same way to 
losses, but the Markowitzians put a greater weight on the .01 probability of losing than the Audacious, so 
that their reservation price is higher. Second, the Markowitzians and the non-Markowitzians put the same 
weight on the .01 probability of losing, but the non-Markowitzians, with their increasingly elastic value 
function over losses, react more strongly to the $1,000 loss than the Markowitzians, with their 
decreasingly elastic value function over losses, so that their reservation price is higher. Third, the non-
Markowitzians and the Cautious react in the same way to losses, but the Cautious put a greater weight on 
the .01 probability of losing than the non-Markowitzians, so that their reservation price is higher. 
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Altogether, we have a differentiated market for insurance, with the willingness to participate depending on 
probability weighing and outcome valuation. In realistic situations, with companies selling insurance well 
above the fair price, the Markowitzians and the Audacious would, in this simulation, probably not 
participate, whereas the non-Markowitzians and the Cautious probably would. This is good news for the 
insurance companies, because the non-Markowitzians and the Cautious were relatively large groups in our 
experiments. 
In making the transition from insurance to gambles, note that those who are „Audacious‟ in losses 
are, because they put less weight on risky outcomes, more cautious than Markowitzians in gains, and that 
those who are „Cautious‟ in losses are, because they put more weight on risky outcomes, more audacious 
than non-Markowitzians in gains. Using the same functional forms as before, and assuming a loss-
aversion coefficient   equal to 2, the reservation prices for a gamble offering a .01 probability of winning 
$1,000 are: 
$38 (Markowitzians), 
$23 (Audacious, now more cautious), 
$15 (non-Markowitzians), and 
$21 (Cautious, now more audacious). 
Three observations can be made. First, the non-Markowitzians put a higher price on the insurance than the 
Markowitzians, but put a lower price on the gamble, and for the same reason. These two groups react in 
the same way to gains, and put the same weight on the .01 probability of winning, but the non-
Markowitzians, with their increasingly elastic value function over losses, react more strongly to the price 
of the gamble than the Markowitzians, with their decreasingly elastic value function over losses, so that 
their reservation price is lower. Second, the Markowitzians and the „Audacious‟ put a higher price on the 
gamble than on the insurance, which means that, in this simulation, gain amplification (a stronger reaction 
to the potential prize than to the potential calamity) outweighs loss aversion (a disproportionately stronger 
reaction to the price of the gamble than to the potential prize). Third, the non-Markowitzians and the 
„Cautious‟ put a significantly higher price on the insurance than on the gamble. This has two reasons. One 
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is that their value function is increasingly elastic in losses but decreasingly elastic in gains (a stronger 
reaction to the potential calamity than to the potential prize). The other reason is loss aversion (a 
disproportionately stronger reaction to the price of the gamble than to the potential prize). The combined 
influence of these two factors yields, in these groups, the pronounced discrepancy between willingness to 
insure and willingness to gamble. Altogether, our analysis implies not only inter-individual differences, 
but also pronounced intra-individual differences in the reaction to insurance and gambles. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) recognized that the purchase of insurance and gambles can be 
determined by many factors, and that the psychophysics of risk and value is only one of them. The same 
caveat applies to our analysis. Moreover, the above analysis of insurance and gambles does not cover all 
realistic situations of decision under risk. If insuring is a form of „playing safe,‟ so is „safe sex,‟ in which a 
relatively small inconvenience (a condom) averts a large potential cost (premature death). Similarly, if 
gambling is a form of „taking a chance,‟ so is „unsafe sex,‟ in which a relatively small enjoyment invites a 
large potential cost. The latter example is an interesting one, because, in gambling, incurring a small loss 
opens the possibility of obtaining a large gain, whereas, in unsafe sex, obtaining a small gain opens the 
possibility of incurring a large loss. Alternative forms of playing safe and taking a chance may receive 
closer attention in future analyses. 
Our modification of prospect theory essentially involves assumptions about the elevation of the 
probability-weighing function (depending on the person, it is more or less elevated), and assumptions 
about the elasticity of the value function (depending on the person and the domain, its elasticity decreases 
or increases with outcome magnitude). Stake-dependent elasticity has not previously been associated with 
prospect theory. After Tversky and Kahneman (1992), users of prospect theory routinely resort to a power 
value function, the elasticity of which is constant in outcome magnitude. We found decreasing elasticity in 
gains. In losses, however, some seem to combine diminishing sensitivity with decreasing elasticity, while 
others seem to combine it with increasing elasticity. Thus, decreasing elasticity is not a universal property 
of the value function over losses, but constant elasticity is certainly disconfirmed by our findings. 
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Finally, our modification of prospect theory does not address a more fundamental limitation of 
prospect theory, which is that it cannot account for a greater preference uncertainty in losses than in gains. 
In what we reported, this is indicated by people whose preferences do not conform to a definite pattern in 
losses (the Wavering), but we also observed systematically longer choice times for losses than for gains, 
especially among the Wavering. One suggestion would be to incorporate the functional forms of prospect 
theory into decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), where „attention weights‟ are given by 
prospect theory‟s probability-weighing function and „valences‟ are given by prospect theory‟s value 
function. The key contribution of decision field theory would be a steeper „goal gradient‟ for losses than 
for gains, as reflected in longer choice times and greater choice inconsistency. Apart from that, the 
qualitative predictions of prospect theory, on which we focused in this paper, would be preserved. 
In sum, we examined Markowitz‟s hypothesis about decision under risk, and, instead of the 
hypothesized pattern, we obtained dispersion and migration effects. Combined, these two effects show that 
loss aversion does not fully capture the asymmetry between gains and losses. Losses not only loom larger 
than gains, they also engender (1) a greater diversity, with different people exhibiting different preference 
patterns (preference heterogeneity) and many people exhibiting preferences that do not conform to a 
definite pattern (preference uncertainty), and (2) a greater variability of preference patterns across risk 
levels. Although our analysis was restricted to the Markowitzian choice series, it covered three central 
issues in decision under risk: How risk preferences depend on the magnitude and sign of the outcomes, 
and on the level of risk involved. Markowitzian choice series consist of elementary choices between a sure 
thing and a gamble, and, even in this severely restricted situation, the typical decision maker does not 
seem to exist. The prevailing approach of modeling a typical decision maker should therefore be 
reconsidered. 
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Appendix 
Following Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), elasticity is defined as v(x)  log(v(x))/log(x) = 
xv(x)/v(x). Thus, elasticity is the rate at which outcome value v(x) changes relative to the rate at which 
outcome x changes. Diminishing sensitivity, which is commonly stated as v(x) < 0 for x > 0 and v(x) > 0 
for x < 0, can also be stated as v(0) = 0 and 0 < v(x) < 1. This means, for instance, that a 10% change in 
the magnitude of x corresponds to less than a 10% change in the magnitude of v(x). 
Elasticity can be constant for all x, or it can vary with x. A power value function v(x) = x

 has 
constant elasticity, because xx-1/x = . The value ratio R(x, p) = v(x)/v(x/p), or the ratio between the 
value of the sure thing and the value of the risky outcome, is inversely related to . When v(x) =  = 1, 
we have a linear value function v(x) = x, and a linear value-ratio function R(x, p) = p. Furthermore, when 0 
< v(x) =  < 1, we have a concave value function v(x) = x

, and a concave value-ratio function R(x, p) = 
p

. Finally, when v(x) =  = 0, we have a constant value function v(x) = 1, and a constant value-ratio 
function R(x, p) = 1. 
An example of a value function with increasing elasticity is an additive combination of two power 
value functions, one characterized by a lower elasticity, or more strongly diminishing sensitivity, than the 
other, i.e., v(x) = x

 + x1-, where 0 <  < ½ and  > 0. The elasticity of this value function is  










1
1)1(
)(
xx
xx
xv , 
which approaches  as x  0, and 1- as x  . Intuitively, when x is very small, most of the curvature is 
determined by the first term of the value function, x

, with elasticity. As x becomes larger and larger, 
however, most of the value, and, therefore, most of the curvature, is determined by the second term of the 
value function, x
1-
, with elasticity 1-. 
Diminishing sensitivity is easier to combine with decreasing elasticity than with increasing 
elasticity (see Scholten and Read 2010). For instance, the value function v(x) = log(x) has as its elasticity 
v(x) = 1/log(x), which is clearly decreasing in x. A log function like this one was proposed by Bernoulli 
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(1738/1954) to describe utility from final states of wealth. However, it has several shortcomings when 
used to describe value from changes in wealth relative to a neutral reference point. An alternative log 
function, proposed by Scholten and Read (2010) in the domain of intertemporal choice, is v(x) = (1/) 
log(1+x). The elasticity of this value function is 
)1log()1(
)(
xx
x
xv




 , 
which approaches 1 as x  0, and 0 as x  . 
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TABLE 1 
Experiments 1 and 2: Relative size (%) of preference groups in choices between x and (10x, .1) and 
choices between x and (2x, .5), and difference of proportions tests with separate variance estimates.
a
 
Designation 
Preference pattern 
x vs. (10x, .1) x vs. (2x, .5) t p Gains Losses 
Markowitzians RS – RA RA – RS 20 
(12) 
7 
(4) 
-3.65 
(-3.27) 
.00 
(.00) 
Audacious RS – RA RS 4 
(3) 
8 
(4) 
1.91 
(0.97) 
.06 
(.33) 
Non-Markowitzians RS – RA RS – RA 16 
(12) 
31 
(22) 
3.78 
(2.86) 
.00 
(.00) 
Cautious RS – RA RA 28 
(26) 
7 
(6) 
-5.76 
(-5.57) 
.00 
(.00) 
Wavering RS – RA Inconsistent 7 
(23) 
7 
(25) 
-0.30 
(0.48) 
.76 
(.63) 
Miscellaneous  25 40 3.36 .00 
a
Numbers in parentheses are those before reclassification of the Wavering. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of the migration effect. 
Evaluation family 
Preference group 
10x choices 2x choices 
M Markowitzians Markowitzians 
A Markowitzians Audacious 
N Cautious Non-Markowitzians 
C Cautious Cautious 
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TABLE 3 
Experiment 3: Relative size (%) of preference groups in choices between x and (10x, .1) and choices 
between x and (2x, .5), and McNemar tests.
a
 
Designation 
Preference pattern 
x vs. (10x, .1) x vs. (2x, .5) 2 p Gains Losses 
Markowitzians RS – RA RA – RS 21 
(13) 
5 
(2) 
62.04 
(42.96) 
.00 
(.00) 
Audacious RS – RA RS 6 
(4) 
9 
(6) 
4.66 
(2.75) 
.03 
(.10) 
Non-Markowitzians RS – RA RS – RA 16 
(9) 
25 
(18) 
19.06 
(25.25) 
.00 
(.00) 
Cautious RS – RA RA 12 
(10) 
6 
(5) 
17.28 
(13.14) 
.00 
(.00) 
Wavering RS – RA Inconsistent 7 
(25) 
6 
(19) 
0.13 
(7.01) 
.72 
(.01) 
Miscellaneous  38 49 19.67 .00 
a
Numbers in parentheses are those before reclassification of the Wavering. 
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TABLE 4 
Experiment 3: Observed minus expected number of transitions between preference groups across choices between x and (10x, .1) and 
choices between x and (2x, .5), upon reclassification of the Wavering.
a
 
Preference group in 10x choices 
Preference group in 2x choices 
Markowitzians Audacious Non-Markowitzians Cautious Wavering Miscellaneous 
Markowitzians 6.78 1.63 -3.03 -2.84 8.53 -11.07 
Audacious 0.31 7.19 0.13 -0.86 -2.02 -4.75 
Non-Markowitzians -4.75 0.09 29.86 -1.22 -2.69 -21.29 
Cautious -1.69 -4.15 7.78 9.94 -0.43 -11.45 
Wavering 0.89 2.49 -2.84 0.68 0.47 -1.68 
Miscellaneous -1.55 -7.24 -31.88 -5.70 -3.86 50.23 
a2(25) = 187.58, p = .00. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Top panel: Aggregate results from Experiment 1 (N = 189), showing the probability of choosing 
sure thing x over the gamble (10x, .1) as a function of outcome magnitude and sign. Bottom panel: 
Aggregate results from Experiment 2 (N = 255), showing the probability of choosing sure thing x over the 
gamble (2x, .5) as a function of outcome magnitude and sign. The whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2. A prospect-theoretical interpretation of dispersion and migration effects. The top left panel 
shows the probability-weighing functions of family C (solid curve), families M and N (dashed curve), and 
family A (dotted curve). The other three panels show Rw-mapping plots, in which probability-weighing 
functions are superimposed on value-ratio functions. The top right panel shows the case of gains for all 
evaluation families. The bottom left panel shows the case of losses for families M and A, while the bottom 
right panel shows the case of losses for families N and C. 
Figure 3. Aggregate results from Experiment 3 (N = 569): On the left, the probability of choosing sure 
thing x over the gamble (10x, .1), and, on the right, the probability of choosing sure thing x over the 
gamble (2x, .5), as a function of outcome magnitude and sign. 
Figure 4. Experiment 3: Difference (d) in incidence rates of the Markowitzians, the non-Markowitzians, 
the Cautious, and the Audacious between 2x and 10x choices, separately for the randomized order 
condition and the non-randomized order conditions. 
Figure 5. Aggregate results from Experiment 2 (top panel) and Experiment 3 (bottom panel): The 
probability of choosing sure thing px over the gamble (x, p) as a function of outcome probability and sign. 
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FIG.2 
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FIG. 3 
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FIG. 4 
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FIG. 5 
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Footnotes 
 
1We use the term „preference reversal‟ to denote a reversal of risk preferences as revealed by a person‟s 
choices. This should be distinguished from the „preference reversals‟ between choice and pricing 
discovered by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), in which a person chooses a safer gamble but assigns a 
higher cash equivalent to a riskier one. 
2
Another possibility is that the probability-weighing function always outweighs the value function: 
)10(
)(
)10(
)(
)10/1(
xv
xv
mxv
mxv
w  . 
This, however, is not a realistic possibility in prospect theory. The probability weight w(1/10) generally 
remains far removed from its upper limit of 1, but, given a decreasingly elastic value function v, the value 
ratio v(x) / v(10x) moves toward 1 as the magnitude of x increases. It will thus become increasingly 
unlikely that w(1/10) exceeds v(x) / v(10x). 
3
Weber and Chapman (2005, Table 5) report results that are consistent with those of Hershey and 
Schoemaker‟s (1980) study. However, they did not examine choices between a sure thing and a gamble, 
but rather choices between two gambles. In their study, aggregate choices were globally and increasingly 
risk averse in gains and globally and increasingly risk seeking in losses. That is, there were no reversals, 
but larger gains resulted in more risk aversion and larger losses resulted in more risk seeking. As in 
Hershey and Schoemaker‟s (1980) study, choice probabilities were closer to chance level for losses than 
for gains. 
4
Comparison of the bottom panels in Figure 2 shows that R(x, p) is less elevated for small x in families N 
and C than for large x in families M and A, meaning that v is more elastic in the former case than in the 
latter. We do not include this among the Characteristics, because value functions differ not only in 
whether elasticity increases or decreases, but also in the range within which, and the rate at which, it 
increases or decreases. For instance, in the Appendix, the elasticity of the increasingly elastic value 
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function ranges from  to 1-, whereas the elasticity of the decreasingly elastic value function ranges 
from 1 to 0. Therefore, elasticity lies in a higher and narrower range in the former case than in the latter. 
5
A situation where the probability-weighing function always outweighs the value function is a realistic 
possibility under increasing elasticity, not under decreasing elasticity (see Footnote 2). 
